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Introduction 
 
In his last speech at the United Nations, then President Barack Obama hailed the economic and social 
achievements of globalization for the developing world. In doing so, he noted: 
 “Over the last 25 years, the number of people living in extreme poverty has been cut from nearly 40 
percent of humanity to under 10 percent.”1 
According to World Bank data, this is true.2 Like many political leaders, Obama attributes this success 
as measured by poverty reduction ― while simultaneously recognizing various shortcomings ― to 
“globalization,” including “the principles of open markets.”  
But the story behind the numbers is vastly different from Obama’s narrative. For the 25 years that he 
refers to, two-thirds of the approximately 1.1 billion people who were pulled across the extreme 
poverty line were in China.3 If we go back a bit further, and look at the period from 1981 to 2010, it 
is even more a story of Chinese success: about 94 percent of the reduction of extreme poverty was in 
China.4 
Not only that, but as noted below, much of the remaining third of the reduction in extreme poverty 
during the past 25 years was also attributable to China, and it happened in the twenty-first century, 
when China rapidly became one the largest importers in the world of other developing countries’ 
exports,5 as well as a source of hundreds of billions of dollars of loans, direct investment, and aid.6  
If the story of globalization’s success ― never mind its failures ― is mainly a story of Chinese 
globalization, then it must be a very different story than the standard narrative. Chinese global 
economic integration was not based on the neoliberal reforms and policies that were adopted by the 
vast majority of low- and middle-income countries since the 1980s. China did not establish an 
independent central bank or abandon the industrial and development policies of prior decades, as 
most low- and middle-income countries did. They maintained state control over the banking system, 
had strict currency controls and a huge role for state-owned enterprises, and until recently the state 
controlled most investment. Foreign investment was regulated to make it compatible with state 
development planning. Technology transfer and other performance requirements ― conditions 
                                                 
1 Obama (2016). 
2 There are some disputes about this poverty data and its interpretation. See, for example, Sumdaram (2016) and Reddy and Lahoti 
(2016).  
3 Hofman (2016).  
4 Olinto, et al. (2013). 
5 IMF DOTS (2017a). 
6 Cooper (2016). 
 The Scorecard on Development, 1960–2016: China and the Global Economic Rebound 2 
 
attached to foreign investment to make sure that the host country gets some benefit from foreign 
investment, such as the use of locally produced inputs, or the hiring of local managers7 ― were 
common and are still an issue of contention with the United States today.8 
The story that actually happened has quite different implications for what we can learn from history 
about economic policy than does the standard narrative. Of course, much of the Chinese model would 
not apply to most low- and middle-income countries because China was transitioning from a planned 
to a mixed economy. (The comparison with other transition economies is still relevant, since China 
sustained the fastest-growing economy in world history for decades during its transition, while Russia 
and most other former Soviet states went through serious depressions and of course never came close 
to China’s performance when they recovered). But in any case there would still be a lot to learn from 
the Chinese experience, possibly more than from the prevailing orthodoxy in most of the rest of the 
developing world. 
It is not only political leaders and journalists that seem to conflate Chinese globalization with the 
experience of most of the world, in evaluating the economic and social progress of recent decades. A 
number of economists have done the same. 
Richard Baldwin, in his 2016 book “The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New 
Globalization,” presents a comprehensive theory of globalization that portrays the global integration 
since 1990 ― as distinguished from previous periods ― as driven by advances in communications 
technology. For Baldwin, these advances, which drastically lowered the cost of moving ideas, reversed 
a centuries-long trend of “The Great Divergence” ― where the gap between rich and poor nations, 
in terms of manufacturing output, increased. He writes: 
From 1990, the trend flipped; a century’s worth of rich nations’ rise had been reversed in just 
two decades. Their share [of manufacturing output] is now back to where it was in 1914. This 
trend, which might be called the “Great Convergence,” is surely the dominant economic fact 
of the last two or three decades.9 
He is referring to the share of world manufacturing belonging to the G-7 countries, which fell from 
65 to 47 percent from 1990 to 2010. He notes that these 18 percentage points were gained by just six 
countries (China, South Korea, India, Poland, Indonesia, and Thailand), while the rest of the world 
stayed roughly the same at about 28 percent.  
                                                 
7 KPMG (2017).  
8 Donnan (2017).  
9 Baldwin (2016a), p1.  
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However, more than 80 percent of the convergence went to China, with the rest being shared by the 
remaining five countries ― including India and Indonesia, home to more than 1.6 billion people.10 
Therefore, the “Great Convergence” in manufacturing is, at least so far, primarily a Chinese 
phenomenon.  
Clearly, the lumping together of China with other groups of low- and middle-income countries can 
obscure, if one is not careful, how narrowly distributed the gains from globalization have been, by 
country; although Baldwin notes that even six countries is a surprisingly small group. But most 
importantly, since China’s economic policies during this period were so different from most of the 
developing world, the standard aggregation makes it difficult to get even a cursory look at the net 
effect of the most widespread policy changes of the era.  
One way to get a first look at what the net effect of what such widely adopted policy changes might 
have been is to compare the era of neoliberal reforms with that of prior decades. We first did that in 
2001, and found a sharp drop-off in the rate of growth of GDP per capita for the vast majority of 
low- and-middle-income countries for the last two decades of the twentieth century, as compared with 
the prior two decades (1960–1980).11 There was also a broad decline in the rate of progress on health 
and some social indicators, including life expectancy, infant and child mortality, adult mortality, and 
educational attainment.  
The methodology for the comparison is relatively simple. We would expect diminishing returns in 
terms of growth rates, as developing countries would typically grow faster than high-income countries. 
And we would also expect diminishing returns in the case of health indicators; e.g., it would 
presumably be more difficult to advance 10 years in life expectancy from a starting point of 70 than 
of 50. In order to adjust for diminishing returns, we compared groups of countries that began at a 
certain level of per capita GDP in 1960, with those that started at the same level of per capita GDP 
in 1980 ― rather than simply looking at what happened to growth rates for the same group of 
countries over time. The same methodology was applied to comparisons of health and social 
indicators. Of course, in some regions the growth collapse of the 1980–2000 period was so profound 
that it was obvious even without controlling for diminishing returns, or looking at country averages. 
In Latin America, for example, regional per capita GDP grew by 91.5 percent from 1960 to 1980, but 
just 5.7 percent from 1980 to 2000. 
We returned to the comparison, including all countries for which there was data, five years later and 
found mostly similar results.12 But by 2011, a noticeable rebound had occurred, both in GDP per 
                                                 
10 See Baldwin (2016a) and (2016b). 
11 Weisbrot et al. (2001). 
12 Weisbrot, Baker, and Rosnick (2005). 
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capita and in progress on some of the major health and social indicators. Some possible reasons for 
the rebound were discussed in our 2011 paper13 and elsewhere,14 and are noted below. This paper 
updates the prior comparisons with the latest data from additional years of the twenty-first century.  
 
 
Two Measures of World Growth and the Effects of 
China and India 
 
There are many ways in which we may examine growth of economic activity in the world. One way 
would be to treat the world as a single economy: we may total the gross domestic product of every 
country, divide by the total population, and observe how fast this grew each year. A second approach 
would be to simply average per capita growth rates among countries; rather than treating the world as 
a single economy, this would describe the average experience across countries. Finally, we might also 
weight such per capita growth rates by population to observe the experience of the average person. 
From a policy perspective, the second of these ― looking at the averages across countries ― makes 
the most sense. Each country represents a distinct observation with different economic policy choices. 
We would not want to say that countries followed successful policies of development because “China 
and Honduras” grew rapidly any more than one would want to say “Bill Gates and I are rich”; rather, 
we would want to say countries have a mixed record with large-economy China succeeding and small-
economy Honduras less so. True, China’s policy affected a much larger share of the world’s population 
and of the world’s economy; but it still represents one policy experiment, as does Honduras’.15 
It may be that these measures do not much differ. Briefly, then, we will compare the first two 
approaches. We will then examine the effect of removing China and/or India from the analysis so as 
to observe their impact on each measure. Obviously, removal of one or two countries will have little 
effect on the unweighted average growth across countries. However, these countries represent a 
significant fraction of the world economy and therefore their exclusion may have a noticeable effect 
on the world’s growth when the world is taken as a single economy. 
In Figure 1, we have linked year-to-year growth rates to create per capita GDP measures indexed to 
1950. The “Country Average” line is based on the simple average of country growth rates, so China 
and Honduras are equally weighted. Over the 65 years from 1950 to 2015, this measure suggests that 
per capita GDP has risen by 329 percent (indexed value of 4.29) — a bit under 2.3 percent per year. 
The other data takes the world as a single economy, and indicates a 297 percent increase (or little more 
                                                 
13 Weisbrot and Ray (2011).  
14 Weisbrot (2015), Chapter 3. 
15 Certainly, development policy is not the only factor in a country’s economic growth. 
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than 2.1 percent per year). This measure weights larger economies more heavily, and therefore 
indicates that overall, growth has been a little slower in larger economies in comparison to smaller 
ones. 
 
FIGURE 1 
World Growth in Real, Per Capita GDP 
 
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015) and IMF WEO (2017b).  
 
This is not overly surprising as economies may be larger due to a larger population or to a higher level 
of development; and we would expect less-developed countries to grow more rapidly. It is perhaps 
more surprising that the gap is not wider. 
In Figure 2, we consider the removal of China and/or India. In the upper left, we have the world — 
as complete as data allows. The graphs to the right exclude India, and the graphs in the second row 
exclude China. As the figure shows, the effect of excluding India is very small — very slightly 
narrowing the gap between the measures of per capita GDP growth by just two-hundredths of a 
percentage point. 
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FIGURE 2 
World Growth in Real, Per Capita GDP (Under Different Scenarios) 
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Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015) and IMF WEO (2017b).  
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On the other hand, excluding China from the calculation greatly reduces growth in the world 
economy. On the whole, per capita GDP growth in the non-China world has slowed since the 1970s. 
Yet, as the other measure indicates, countries have — on average — resumed growth since the 1990s. 
That recent non-China growth has been lower when more heavily weighting large countries suggests 
that China has been a significant outlier among large economies. We will take this into account in 
more careful analysis later. 
 
 
Economic Growth Since the Last Report 
 
In the aggregate, world economic growth was nearly unchanged in 2010–2015 when compared to 
2000–2010 — at 3.9 percent annualized, compared to 4 percent, respectively. 16 However, a much 
higher decline can be seen when averaging countries’ growth as compared to aggregating the world as 
a single economy. The average rate of growth fell from 2.8 to only 1.8 percent per capita per year, 
with every region slowing, from 2010 to 2015. Figure 3 shows this comparison for the country 
average, by region. 
                                                 
16 IMF WEO (2017b). 
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FIGURE 3 
Regional Growth by Country Average 2010–2015 vs. 2000–2010 
 
Source: IMF WEO (2017b).  
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Approach 
In the figures that follow, we describe worldwide progress by initial level and period. The world 
consists of all countries observed up to three times each — beginning in 1960, 1980, and 2000. 17 
These country periods are pooled, then divided into quintiles; the quintile groups are only then 
separated by initial year of observation. Each figure shows the growth in the unweighted average for 
each of the 15 groups (i.e., five quintiles for each initial starting year). Within each quintile then, all 
observations are of similar initial level regardless of the time period. This allows a simple 
comparison of progress across time without undue concern for diminishing returns. 
 
 
Economic Growth 
Figure 4 shows economic growth for each quintile of worldwide income. The quintiles are defined 
by start-of-period gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2011 international dollars, adjusted for 
both inflation and for purchasing power parity (PPP). Growth in per capita GDP, however, is based 
on each country’s national accounts adjusted only for inflation. 
 
FIGURE 4 
Real, Per Capita GDP 
 
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015) and IMF WEO (2017b).  
As Figure 4 clearly shows, average growth in per capita GDP slowed considerably over 1980–2000 in 
comparison to 1960–1980. This slowdown occurred across the full range of incomes. For quintiles 1 
through 4, growth increased again in the 2000–2015 period. There is nothing special about the dates 
                                                 
17 For more explanation see Weisbrot and Ray (2011). 
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selected here. If we were to cherry-pick, we might find that 1980–1995 was an especially poor period: 
the latter half of the 1990’s looked more like the 2000s than the 1980s. And including the 1970s in the 
first period ensures that we are not using a baseline that has extraordinarily favorable circumstances: 
the decade contained two major oil shocks that led to world recessions, as well as high inflation. If the 
fifties were included, the baseline period would have been stronger. 
The slowdown in per capita GDP growth in the second time frame is quite large, especially over a 20-
year period. For example, a country starting out in the second quintile in 1960 would, on average, 
increase its per capita income by 62 percent over the ensuing two decades; in 1980, the corresponding 
increase would be just 15 percent. 
 
 
Mortality and Life Expectancy 
 
There is a very high cross-country correlation between life expectancy, and other measures of health, 
with income, although there is controversy over the causal relationship.18 This relationship also shows 
up in our examination of the changes in per capita GDP growth rates and the rate of improvement in 
health indicators. 
Patterns of progress in child mortality are little changed from those observed in the previous edition 
of this report, as can be seen in Figure 5. For those in the bottom two quintiles (96–396 deaths per 
1,000 live births), mortality rates have fallen more rapidly in 2000–2015 after a notable slowdown in 
the 1980–2000 period. 
  
                                                 
18 See Deaton (2013) and Weil (2015). 
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FIGURE 5 
Mortality Rate, Under Age 5 (per 1,000 live births) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
The pattern is less clear in the upper quintiles as diminishing returns take hold.  
Adult mortality rates, likewise, have fallen much more rapidly in the last 15 years — following a 
disastrous two decades. 
At the upper quintiles, mortality rates have fallen slower over time — albeit from low levels. There is 
some acceleration in the most recent period that is especially sharp among males, as can be seen in 
Figure 6. For males in the fourth quintile, mortality rates fell by 2.3 per year over 2000–2015 
compared to 1.1 per year over 1960–1980. Among those in the fifth quintile, (77–186 deaths per 1,000 
adult males), mortality rates had fallen by only 0.5 per year from 1960 to 1980, but 2.0 per year from 
2000 to 2015. Thus, despite diminishing returns, where mortality rates were already low, progress for 
this group has been comparable to those in the middle back in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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FIGURE 6 
Mortality Rate, Adult, Female (per 1,000 female adults) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
  
FIGURE 7 
Mortality Rate, Adult, Male (per 1,000 male adults) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
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three per year. All 16 countries that lost that much ground are located in Sub-Saharan Africa and did 
so over 1980–2000. Fourteen of those 16 were in the second quintile — the exceptions being 
middle-quintile Zimbabwe and Botswana. All 16 began 2000 in the bottom quintile and all bounced 
back in the most recent period. 
If we reanalyze with these 16 countries removed, we still observe a noticeable slowing of progress in 
the 1980–2000 period, especially in the second quintile. But we see neither the extreme failure nor 
the exceptional bounce back. For example, we see the reanalyzed numbers for females below, in 
Figure 8. 
 
FIGURE 8 
Mortality Rate, Adult, Female (per 1,000 female adults), With Selected Countries Removed 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
The rate of progress in reducing infant mortality also shows a sharp decline for 1980-2000, in the 
first three quintiles, with a rebound in the twenty-first century. This can be seen in Figure 9.  
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FIGURE 9 
Mortality Rate, Infant (per 1,000 live births) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
As go mortality rates, so must follow life expectancy. For life expectancy at birth, we again see 
diminishing returns: improvements in life expectancy are more pronounced in countries with lower 
initial life expectancy. However, we still observe that 1980–2000 was a period of relatively slow 
progress on this front at the bottom. If life expectancies had increased at the 1960–1980 rate, then 
people in second-quintile countries in 1980 would have enjoyed an additional five years of life on 
average by 2000. 
 
FIGURE 10 
Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (years) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
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Again, much of this very sharp decline in the second quintile is due to HIV/AIDS. The only 
significant fall in life expectancy (as opposed to a fall in the rate of improvement of life expectancy) 
reported outside of 1980–2000 Sub-Saharan Africa was in Cambodia (from 41.2 years of life in 1960 
to only 27.7 in 1980; this was obviously related to the war and political violence there). Cambodian 
life expectancy also bounced back quickly, reaching 58.4 years in 2000 and 68.5 in 2015. 
The story is similar when separating males and females, as can be seen in Figures 11 and 12. In the 
second quintile, we see a sharp falloff in progress (1980–2000), especially in female life expectancy 
gains, and then a rebound. After gaining 1.3 years over the 20 years from 1960 to 1980, male life 
expectancy at birth for the fifth quintile rose 3.4 years during the last 15 years (2000–2015).  
 
FIGURE 11 
Life Expectancy at Birth, Female (years) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
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FIGURE 12 
Life Expectancy at Birth, Male (years) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
Finally, these results are reflected in the closely related odds of survival to age 65. In 2015, males in 
the top quintile were nearly 7 percentage points more likely to survive to age 65 than they would 
have had progress proceeded at the 1960–1980 pace. As with gains in life expectancy, we see the 
pattern of slowing progress and resurgence in the bottom three quintiles of survival rates. 
 
FIGURE 13 
Survival to Age 65, Male (percent of cohort) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
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FIGURE 14 
Survival to Age 65, Female (percent of cohort) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
 
 
 
School Enrollment 
 
FIGURE 15 
Gross Enrollment Ratio, Preprimary, Both Sexes (percent) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
Gross enrollment ratios in preprimary education rose more rapidly over 2000–2015 in comparison 
to the two decades prior. The increase came across all quintiles, but in the fourth quintile we see the 
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largest improvement in progress — from 0.7 percentage points per year to 1.5 percentage points per 
year for countries with initial enrollment between 51 and 73 percent. Over the 15 years, this 
increased progress represents an additional 12 percentage points of preprimary enrollment. 19 
For primary education, enrollment rates improved more rapidly in the lowest quintile — where 
initial enrollment rates were less than 100 percent, as can be seen in Figure 16. Among quintiles 
three through five, initial enrollment rates exceeded 100 percent ― which is possible because the 
denominator is the population of primary school age. To the extent that older students are also 
enrolled, this raises rates; as primary education becomes universal, the base becomes limited to 
students of primary school age and gross enrollment rates must fall. 
 
FIGURE 16 
Gross Enrollment Ratio, Primary, Both Sexes (percent) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
 
Progress in increasing gross enrollment in tertiary education has been less even. Quintile three 
showed the most rapid progress in increasing overall gross enrollment rates, followed by the fourth 
and fifth quintile. 
  
                                                 
19 There are comparatively fewer observations for data on education than for other indicators cited throughout this report. For a 
further discussion on education and data availability, see United Nations (2015).  
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FIGURE 17 
Gross Enrollment Ratio, Tertiary, Both Sexes (percent) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
 
This story over time is a little more clear, however, when breaking out enrollment rates by sex. For 
males, enrollment rates improved most rapidly in the middle quintile, as can be seen in Figure 18. But 
rates in the first and fifth quintiles increased their rates of improvement considerably, when compared 
to 1980–2000. 
 
FIGURE 18 
School Enrollment, Tertiary, Male (Percent Gross) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
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For females in the second and fourth quintiles however, enrollment rates if anything rose faster 
during the 1980–2000 period than in 2000–2015. For the 1980–2000 period, there is data for only 
one country in the fifth quintile. By 2000, however, an additional 15 countries moved into the fifth 
quintile after experiencing rapid increases in the prior period.  
 
FIGURE 19 
School Enrollment, Tertiary, Female (percent gross) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
Overall, female enrollment in tertiary education has been increasing at a faster rate than for men, 
especially in the top three quintiles. In virtually all developed countries, female enrollment is now 
greater than male enrollment. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia, however, enrollment rates 
have not increased at as high a rate overall, nor have female enrollment rates increased significantly 
faster than those of males. 20  
 
 
Miscellaneous Indicators 
Progress in immunization of one-year-olds has slowed particularly among the lowest quintiles, as can 
be seen in Figure 20 and 21. Diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) immunization rates in the first 
quintile (1–42 percent) rose by an average of 3 percentage points per year between 1980 and 2000, but 
have risen only 1.7 percentage points per year since then. Likewise, immunization rates for measles 
among the first quintile rose more slowly — 2.3 percentage points per year compared to 3.0 in 1980–
2000. 
  
                                                 
20 United Nations (2015). 
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FIGURE 20 
Immunization, DPT (percent of children ages 12–23 months) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
 
FIGURE 21 
Immunization, Measles (percent of children ages 12–23 months) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
However, the slowdown of the last 15 years is more modest than it initially appears. The first quintile 
covers a very wide range of immunization rates, and some of the decline reflects movement from the 
first to second deciles, which can be seen below in Figures 22 and 23. For measles, the first decile 
progress in immunization may have accelerated. 
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FIGURE 22 
Immunization, DPT (percent of children ages 12–23 months) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
 
FIGURE 23 
Immunization, Measles (percent of children ages 12–23 months) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
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Finally, as can be seen in Figure 24, fertility rates among women aged 15–19 have fallen, across the 
board, more rapidly than they had over 1960–1980. 
 
FIGURE 24 
Adolescent Fertility Rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15–19) 
 
Source: World Bank (2017).  
 
 
Chinese-Led Growth 
As noted above, one way in which China contributed to the twenty-first-century rebound of many 
developing countries is through its demand for their exports. 
From 1990 until its peak in 2013, the share of low- and middle-income country exports sent to 
China increased from 0.8 percent to 9.7 percent, going from $4 billion to more than $520 billion. 
Measured as a percent of low- and middle-income countries’ total GDP, the increase was from 0.1 
percent to 2.6 percent, as can be seen in Figure 25. 
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FIGURE 25 
Low- and Middle-Income Country Exports to China 
 
Sources: IMF DOTS (2017a) and IMF WEO (2017b).  
From 2013 to 2016, coinciding with a growth slowdown in China and falling commodity prices, low- 
and middle-income country exports to China decreased by about $150 billion, to 2.0 percent of their 
GDP. The share of total low- and middle-income country exports going to China fell from 9.7 to 9.0 
percent. 
In 1990, the share of low- and middle-income country exports to the world’s advanced economies 
was 73.9 percent. By 2013, it had fallen to 54.7 percent. In the last three years, it has increased 
slightly, to 56.3 percent. As a percent of GDP, low- and middle-income country exports to advanced 
economies peaked in 2006 at 18.3 percent before briefly dipping during the Great Recession. Still, 
even as advanced economies return to growth, low- and middle-income country’s exports to them, 
as a percent of GDP, have decreased in recent years to a 20-year low of 12.4 percent. 
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Conclusion 
 
Comparing the performance of low- and-middle-income countries in the twenty-first century with 
that of prior decades, on per capita GDP growth and the rate of progress on various health and social 
indicators, it is clear that there is still a sizeable rebound from the very unusual long-term failure of 
the last two decades of the twentieth century. Including the additional six years of data since our last 
paper does not seem to significantly change this comparison.  
There are a number of possible explanations for the rebound. The most obvious is the unprecedented 
economic growth of China, and its increasing importance to so many low- and middle-income 
countries. China’s increased demand for their exports, noted above, not only provided a direct 
stimulus to their economies, but in driving up commodity prices it also helped many countries 
accumulate reserves and avoid balance of payment problems that in the past had constrained their 
growth ― or in some cases led to severe economic crises. 
The IMF’s loss of power in most middle-income countries may have also contributed to those 
countries’ improved economic performance in the twenty-first century. The IMF’s loan portfolio fell 
from $105 billion to less than $20 billion from 2003 to 2007. It bounced back to new highs during the 
world economic crisis and world economic downturn of 2008–2009, but the vast majority of the new 
lending went to Europe. The IMF has been an important driver of neoliberal policy reforms and 
procyclical macroeconomic policies in low- and middle-income countries.21 The Fund has headed up 
something of a creditors’ cartel for its borrowers in the developing world, in which loans from the 
much-larger World Bank and other multilateral lending, including from rich country governments, 
was generally contingent on IMF approval. But the middle-income countries of Asia, Latin America, 
and other regions mostly avoided borrowing from the Fund after the highly publicized bad experiences 
of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–1999. And the creditors’ cartel was also greatly weakened. 
During the world economic downturn, the IMF did include procyclical policies in many of its loan 
agreements in developing countries, but there is some evidence that this was more moderate, or less 
damaging, than in the past.22 Irrespective of the role of the IMF, it is clear that the response of low- 
and middle-income countries to the 2008–2009 downturn was more likely to be countercyclical than 
in prior downturns. A 2011 study found that 35 percent of developing countries had countercyclical 
policies for the years 2000–2009, as compared to just 8 percent during 1960–1999.23 At the same time, 
                                                 
21 Weisbrot et al. (2009). 
22 Weisbrot (2015), Chapter 3. 
23 Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin (2011), p. 4.  
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some of the failed economic policies of the late twentieth century, such as overvalued fixed exchange 
rates in Argentina, Brazil, Russia, and elsewhere were abandoned. 
One factor that seems not to have contributed to the twenty-first-century rebound for most 
developing countries was the economic growth of the high-income countries. These high-income 
countries’ aggregate real GDP growth averaged 3.1 percent annually from 1980 to 2000, but just 1.9 
percent from 2000 to 2017.24  
Whatever the explanations for the twenty-first century rebound, the striking long-term growth failure 
of the last two decades of the twentieth century remains unexplained and largely ignored. In the 
comparison made in this paper, which looks at countries starting out at the same level of per capita 
GDP in 1960, 1980, and 2000, countries starting out at these levels in later decades should ― all other 
things being equal ― show more rapid progress. We would expect this because there is more advanced 
technology and knowledge available as compared to 20 years prior. The same should be true for 
advances in life expectancy and other health indicators, because of advances in medicine, science, and 
public health. And yet the opposite happened in the last two decades of the twentieth century. These 
decades coincided with a set of neoliberal reforms that were implemented in dozens of low- and 
middle-income countries: increasing independence of central banks, tighter (and more often 
procyclical) fiscal and monetary policies, the abandonment of previously employed industrial and 
development policies, indiscriminate openings to international trade and capital flows, other 
deregulatory reforms, and increasing protectionism with regard to intellectual property.  
Of course, the fact that this long-term economic failure coincided with the widespread adoption of a 
set of reforms in low- and middle-income countries does not prove a causal connection. But it should 
at least be cause for concern, and some skepticism about these neoliberal reforms generally, as well as 
the institutions that have promoted, enforced (the IMF and World Bank) or codified (the World Trade 
Organization) these reforms in their rules. Both the long-term failure and the rebound of the twenty-
first century should be topics of interest to economists.  
It is ironic that one of the few developing countries that decidedly did not follow a neoliberal path 
since 1980 multiplied its per capita income by a factor of 21 by 2017, 25 became the largest economy 
in the world,26 and played a major role in pulling dozens of other countries out of their long slump. 
This history, as we have seen, is somewhat different from the popular narrative that “globalization,” 
                                                 
24 IMF WEO (2017b). 
25 Ibid., “China: Gross domestic product per capita, constant prices (National currency).” 
26 On a purchasing power parity basis, China’s GDP was estimated by the IMF at $23.2 trillion in 2017, versus $19.4 trillion for the 
United States. See IMF WEO (2017b), “China: Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country 
GDP (Current international dollar)” and “United States: Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation 
of country GDP (Current international dollar).”  
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as embodied in the way that most low and middle-income countries increasingly participated in the 
global economy ― and the reforms that they adopted ― proved successful. 
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Appendix 
 
In comparison to earlier versions of this report, fourth quintile ($7,020–$14,500) growth over 1980–
2000 was relatively strong. Growth in this group came in at 2.2 percent per capita per year, compared 
to only 1.1 percent in the previous editions. At it happens, every change in sample and data contributed 
to increasing the growth estimate for this group. For one, differences in data for the same country 
periods as in the previous report added 0.26 percentage points to the estimated rate. 
 
FIGURE A1 
Reconciling Fourth Quintile 1980–2000 From Prior Data 
 
Sources: Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015) and IMF WEO (2017b).  
Removing countries which in this report are no longer seen to be in the fourth quintile raises the 
growth estimate another 0.36 percentage points. This includes middle-quintile countries such as 
Lebanon, Jordan, Suriname, Romania, and Guatemala ― all of which had been observed to experience 
negative growth. The level of PPP-adjusted GDP in 1980 for São Tomé and Príncipe has been 
significantly reduced, putting it in only the second quintile. This removed from the fourth quintile a 
country that was an especially terrible performer. Slow-growth Brazil, and Argentina, have also been 
moved to the middle quintile along with relatively fast growth in Saint Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, 
and Mauritius. On balance, all such shifts out of the fourth quintile removed a fair bit of poor numbers 
into other quintiles. 
Adding countries that were previously observed but seem to be in quintiles other than the fourth again 
raised the growth estimate by 0.14 percentage points. These included countries that performed 
relatively well for the period such as Turkey, Macao, and Oman, and “tigers” such as Ireland and 
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Singapore. On balance, these did more to raise growth in the quintile than Algeria and Bulgaria’s poor 
performances could lower it. 
Finally, including previously unobserved country periods in the fourth quintile raised the estimate 0.32 
percentage points. These additions consisted of a few small island nations (Aruba, Montserrat, the 
British Virgin Islands, and Anguilla) all of which performed well ― averaging over 4 percent per 
capita, annualized. 
There is no particular reason why these changes should have all shifted the estimate all in the same 
direction, and there is no obvious reason to believe that the latest estimate is “better” or “worse” than 
that of the 2011 report. However, we note that even doubling the estimated growth rate for 1980–
2000 does not suffice to close the gap relative to 1960–1980 or 2000–2015. The falloff in growth 
elsewhere was simply too large. 
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